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ABSTRACTS
Het lijdt geen twijfel dat de economische crisis heeft geleid tot een toename van
het aantal scheepvaart- en handelszaken voor de rechtbanken die de kwestie van
economische tegenspoed aanhalen als excuus voor de niet-uitvoering van het con-
tract. Als een juridisch begrip, zelfs in de westerse rechtssystemen, vormen de cul-
turele en normatieve verschillen een grote uitdaging voor de gerechtelijke en
arbitrale rechtbanken om de juiste oplossing te vinden. De twee uitersten zijn hetzij
dat tegenspoed geen excuus is voor niet-uitvoering of dat het vereist dat de over-
eenkomst moet worden aangepast, hetzij langs gerechtelijke weg of door de par-
tijen. Dit artikel belicht enkele van deze verschillen tussen de rechtssystemen en
benadrukt dat commerciële mensen kunnen en moeten worden vertrouwd om
oplossingen voor de verstorende effecten op de contractuele betrekkingen te vin-
den. Commerciële regelingen of oplossingen zijn echter even succesvol als het
rechtssysteem waarop ze gebaseerd zijn. Dit artikel is dus bedoeld om de ontwik-
kelingen in de denkwereld van het Europese handelsrecht te bestuderen waarvan
zou kunnen worden gezegd dat ze commerciële creativiteit en innovatie ondersteu-
nen of hinderen. Vanuit het oogpunt van het Engels recht zal worden aangetoond
dat deze ontwikkelingen geen leerstellige ontwikkelingen genoemd kunnen wor-
den op zich, maar louter een pragmatische, in overeenstemming met de erfenis
van het gemeenrecht, toepassing van de huidige leerstellige regels. De leerstellige
uitdagingen zouden deze pragmatische oplossingen echter kunnen belemmeren,
1 I am very grateful for the research assistance from Carlo Corcione, a legal researcher at the City Law
School.
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zoals zou worden betoogd. Scheepvaartcontracten bieden een nuttige achtergrond
vanwege hun geglobaliseerde en transnationale aard. Uiteraard, scheepvaart-
contracten worden vaak gezien als een zuivere versie van contracten, gezien de
veronderstelde gelijke onderhandelingspositie van beide partijen.

Cela ne fait aucun doute que la crise économique a entraîné une augmentation du
nombre d’affaires de transport et de commerce portées devant les tribunaux, sou-
levant la question des difficultés économiques comme une excuse pour la non-exé-
cution du contrat. Comme notion juridique, même dans les systèmes juridiques
occidentaux, les différences culturelles et normatives représentent un fameux défi
pour les tribunaux judiciaires et arbitraux qui s’efforcent de trouver la bonne solu-
tion. Les deux extrêmes sont soit que les difficultés n’excusent pas l’exécution ou
qu’elles nécessitent une modification du contrat, que celle-ci soit judiciaire ou
apportée par les parties. Le présent article met en lumière certaines de ces diffé-
rences entre les systèmes juridiques et souligne le fait que les commerciaux
peuvent et devraient trouver des solutions aux effets perturbateurs sur les rela-
tions contractuelles. Toutefois, le succès des solutions ou des arrangements com-
merciaux ne repose que sur l’efficacité du système juridique sur lequel ils sont fon-
dés. Le présent article vise donc à étudier les développements dans la logique du
droit commercial européen qui, dit-on, soutient ou entrave la créativité et l’inno-
vation commerciale. Du point de vue du droit anglais, il sera démontré que les
développements en question ne peuvent pas être considérés comme des dévelop-
pements doctrinaux en soi, mais seulement comme une application plus pragma-
tique, cohérente avec l’héritage de la Common law, des règles doctrinales
actuelles. Les défis en termes de doctrine pourraient toutefois faire obstacle à ces
solutions pragmatiques, comme d’aucuns pourraient l’affirmer. Les contrats
d’expédition servent de toile de fond utile en raison de leur nature mondialisée et
transnationale. Naturellement, les contrats d’expédition sont souvent considérés
comme une version pure des contrats, étant donné les positions de négociation
présumées égales des deux parties.

There is no doubt that the economic crisis has led to an increased number of ship-
ping and trade cases before the courts which raise the issue of economic hardship
as an excuse for non-performance of the contract. As a legal concept, even in west-
ern legal systems, the cultural and normative differences pose a serious challenge
for judicial and arbitral tribunals to find the right solution. The two extremes are
either that hardship does not excuse performance or that it requires the contract
to be modified, either judicially or by the parties. This article highlights some of
these differences between the legal systems and emphasises that commercial peo-
ple can and should be trusted to find solutions to the disruptive effects to contrac-
tual relations. However, commercial arrangements or solutions are only as suc-
cessful as the legal system on which they are founded. This article thus aims to
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 5 / 2
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
112
study the developments in European commercial law thinking which might be said
to support or hinder commercial creativity and innovation. From an English law
point of view, it will be demonstrated that these developments could not be said
to be doctrinal developments per se, but merely a more pragmatic, as consistent
with the heritage of the common law, application of the current doctrinal rules. The
doctrinal challenges however could impede these pragmatic solutions as would be
argued. Shipping contracts provide a useful backdrop because of their globalised
and transnational nature. Of course, shipping contracts are often seen as a pure
version of contracts given the presumed equal bargaining positions of both parties.

1. Introduction
1. Economic hardship, as a legal concept, has taken on a complexion of impor-
tance in international trade law in recent times2. The cultural differences
between diverse jurisdictions affecting and influencing the way commercial or
economic hardship as constructed by law have become to some extent particu-
larly pronounced. This article highlights some of these differences between the
legal systems and emphasises that commercial people can and should be trusted
to find solutions to the disruptive effects to contractual relations. These solu-
tions may include contractual clauses providing for hardship, changed circum-
stances, good faith, renegotiation3 and judicial or third party supervision of the
contract performance. However, commercial arrangements are only as success-
ful as the legal system on which they are founded. The aim of this article is thus
an evaluation of developments in European commercial law thinking which
might be said to support or hinder commercial creativity and innovation. From
an English law point of view, it will be demonstrated that these developments
could not be said to be doctrinal developments per se, but merely a more prag-
matic, as consistent with the heritage of the common law, application of the cur-
rent doctrinal rules. The doctrinal challenges however can and will impede these
pragmatic solutions as would be argued. Shipping contracts make for an inter-
2 Perhaps understandably with the many global and regional events causing economic disruption in the
last ten years or so; the international trade and transport sector has traversed from one major eco-
nomic disruption to another so that many have considered it poor commercial practice not to make
preparation for these events or incidents which could easily affect, limit or frustrate the performance
properly established commercial and contractual relations. See for example the voluminous references
at www.cisg.law.pace.edu/ and www.trans-lex.org/.
3 On renegotiation, see generally N. HORN (ed.), Adaptation and Renegotiation of Contracts in Inter-
national Trade and Finance: Studies in Transnational Economic Law 3, Antwerp: Kluwer Law Inter-
national, 1985.
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esting backdrop given the globalised and transnational nature and the fact that
it is a very pure form of a commercial relationship4.
Most readers of this journal will have an awareness of the idea of economic
hardship. They also are likely to have a strong sense that different legal systems
provide for different legal implications arising from economic hardship. It is
trite principle of western contract law that when the performance of the contract
has become more onerous, in general, the performing party is not entitled to
terminate the contract simply on that basis. At the other end, where a contract
has become impossible to perform because of extraneous factors, the perfor-
ming party may discharged from his contractual obligations. In the English com-
mon law tradition, it is equally trite that there is no halfway house – namely,
serious hardship does not discharge the contract if there is no impossibility. In
some systems within the civil law tradition, there is greater latitude given.
This subject perhaps has great resonance in Belgium given the case of Scaform
International BV v. Lorraine Tubes S.A.S.5 which created a bit of a stir in inter-
national legal circles. That said, it must be recalled that the controversies in that
case centred mainly on whether and to what extent the Vienna Convention on
the International Sale of Goods Contracts 1980 (CISG) accommodated the
question of economic hardship and whether the UNIDROIT Principles6 could
be used to interpret the relevant provisions in the CISG on impossibility and
hardship. Be that as it may, the principles surrounding the approach as to what
constitutes hardship and how judicial enforcement should be applied to the
general duty to renegotiate the commercial arrangement would have an impact
on shipping disputes.
2. Given this background, it would be perhaps appropriate to begin with the
general definition in the UNIDROIT Principles 2010 which resembles the
approach taken in the civilian legal traditions. Article 6.2.2 provides:
“There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally
alters the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a
party’s performance has increased or because the value of the perfor-
mance a party receives has diminished, and
4 The equilibrium between the bargaining parties is usually more stable unlike that in a consumer con-
tract. That is however not say that in shipping there is no imbalance of contracting strengths, however,
the relationships are highly commercialised, over a defined period of time and rely heavily on industry
norms and standard practices.
5 Belgium 19 June 2009 Court of Cassation.
6 In that case, the 2004 UNIDROIT Principles were considered.
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(a) the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party
after the conclusion of the contract;
(b) the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by
the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract;
(c) the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and
(d) the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged
party.”
There are a several prerequisites in this definition – the events must have
occurred after the conclusion of the contract and, more importantly, the con-
tract did not and could not envisage these risks and thus, did not make provision
for them. Article 6.2.3 goes on to provide for the appropriate remedy – largely
the conferment of a right to renegotiate the contract. It states:
“(1) In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to request
renegotiations. The request shall be made without undue delay and
shall indicate the grounds on which it is based.
(2) The request for renegotiation does not itself entitle the disadvan-
taged party to withhold performance.
(3) Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time either
party may resort to the court.
(4) If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,
(a) terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed; or
(b) adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium.”
In the shipping world, the economic crisis of 2008-2009 brought home the real-
ities of economic hardship. The collapse of freight rates meant that charterers
who have entered into long-term charterparties found themselves trapped in
substantially unprofitable contracts. It should be pointed out that in a good
number of such cases, the law is not relied on. Indeed, in a good number of cases
it would be in the shipowner’s interest to allow the charterer to renegotiate rates.
However, the renegotiation of rates is not without legal perils and risks. We shall
explore more of this later on. It suffices at this stage to say that the principle in
civil law, generally, needs to be applied with proper and due regard to commer-
cial practicalities and risks.
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 5 / 2
Renegotiating Shipping Contracts and contractual remedies in times of Economic Hardship
115
2. A Snapshot of the Different Legal Traditions in Europe7
It is not intended for this section to provide a detailed analysis of how the diffe-
rent jurisdictions in western Europe deals with changed circumstances in con-
tractual relations. However, a snapshot or bird eye’s view of the legal tapestry is
essential in our examination of the matter of renegotiation of shipping and trade
contracts.
3. From an English common law perspective, the rule of ‘absolute obligation’
applied until the 19th century when the royal courts adopted and began to
develop a new doctrine – the doctrine of frustration of contracts. The germ of
the idea of frustration is seen sometimes as a judicially endorsed measure of gap
filling8. The presumption is that the parties must have intended for their con-
tractual relationship to be subject to an implied term which excuses perfor-
mance on the basis of supervening impossibility or illegality9. The converse
therefore is true – unless a contract could properly be said to have been frus-
trated, the parties are not freed from their contracts.
Many English commercial lawyers will be familiar with Lord Diplock’s words
in Pioneer Shipping Ltd v. BTP Tioxide Ltd10 that frustration is “…never a pure
question of fact but does in the ultimate analysis involve a conclusion of law as
to whether the frustrating event or series of events has made the performance of
the contract a thing radically different from that which was undertaken by the
contract.” This construction or interpretation of the idea of frustration follows
Lord Radcliff’s in Davis Contractors v. Fareham Urban DC11 in which the
House of Lords rejected the constructors’ claim that a construction contract was
frustrated because the unforeseen labour shortages, which resulted in delay and
increase in costs, were within the ordinary range of commercial probability. The
requirement as far as English law is concerned is that for frustration to exist,
7 It is always challenging to define Europe or European in comparative law works; in the context of this
article, we take the methodological position that for the purposes of a basic comparison of different
legal cultures, it would be sufficient to take a snapshot of mainly a few major western European
systems. For a functional and comparative study of the French, German, English and US approaches
to hardship or changed circumstances see C. PEDAMON and J. CHUAH, Hardship in Transnational
Commercial Contracts – A Critique of the Legal, Judicial and Contractual Remedies, Paris Legal Pub-
lishing, Zutphen, The Netherlands 2013. For a descriptive account of the different legal systems, see
E. HONDIUS and H.C. GRIGOLEIT, H.C (ed.) Unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law,
2nd. ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011.
8 Ibid., at chapter 3.
9 PEEL, Treitel on The Law of Contract, 13th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2011, 821.
10 In Pioneer Shipping Ltd v. BTP Tioxide Ltd, 1982, A.C., 724. Also, TREITEL, “Frustration and Force
Majeure”, ibid. at p. 314. The frustration of purpose doctrine amounts to the discharge of the con-
tract: see E. EWAN MCKENDRICK, Discharge by Frustration in AG Guest (ed.) “Chitty on Contracts,
Vol. I: General Principles”, 30th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2008, paras 23-001-23-006.
11 1956, A.C., 696.
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there should be, subsequent to the conclusion of a contract, a fundamentally
different situation has emerged unexpectedly12. It indeed thus follows that
abnormal rise or fall in prices or shortage of supplies needed for production
would not usually frustrate a contract. They must cause a “fundamental change
in the performance itself.” English law does not refer to the equilibrium of the
contract and limits itself to economic considerations, which is different from the
provisions in the UNIDROIT Principles and the EU Principles of European Con-
tract Law (PECL)13.
As Lord Simon said in the British Movietonews case14:
“The parties to an executory contract are often faced, in the course
of carrying it out, with a turn of events which they did not at all
anticipate – a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depre-
ciation of currency, and unexpected obstacle to execution, or the like.
Yet this does not in itself affect the bargain they have made. If, on the
other hand, a consideration of the terms of the contract, in the light
of the circumstances, existing when it was made, shows that they
never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different situation which
has now unexpectedly emerged, the contract ceases to bind at that
point – not because the court in its discretion thinks it just and rea-
sonable to qualify the terms of the contract, but because on its true
construction its does not apply in that situation.”
4. The English court is resolved thus in law not to compel any adaptation of the
contract to accommodate the changed circumstances or to relieve the parties
from performance on the grounds of hardship or changed circumstances. How-
ever, the laissez-faire attitude toward contracts in English law also means that
where the parties have made their own arrangements in the contract to deal with
any fallout from changed circumstances or indeed to define what constitutes
excusatory changed circumstances, the courts are quite prepared to recognise
and give full effect to their presumed intention. The emphasis on presumed
intention both in the characterisation of the doctrine of frustration and the con-
struction of the contract in how it addresses changed circumstances is impor-
12 TREITEL, “Frustration and Force Majeure”, ibid., at p. 314. “The frustration of purpose doctrine
amounts to the discharge of the contract”, see E. EWAN MCKENDRICK, Discharge by Frustration in AG
Guest (ed.) “Chitty on Contracts, Vol. I: General Principles”, 30th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, London,
2008, paras 23-001-23-006.
13 R. BACKHAUS, “The Limits of the duty to perform in the Principles of European Contract Law”, EJCL,
March 2004, Vol. 8.1, at 8. Also C. PEDAMON & J. CHUAH, supra, n. 7, at Chapter 4.
14 British Movietonews Ltd v. London and District Cinemas Ltd, 1952, A.C., 166 at 185.
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tant15. Indeed, that reference to the presumed intention may be said to be the
basis of any judicial intervention.
5. First, not all supervening radical events are relevant – the extent an event is
relevant depends on what the subject matter of the contract is found to be. In a
shipping and international trade case, Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v. Noblee Thorl
GmbH16, the contract in question was a CIF Hamburg contract for a cargo of
Sudanese nuts. The conventional route would have been from Port Sudan to
Hamburg. However, the Suez Canal was closed as a result of the Suez crisis. The
ship could of course sail the much longer route, namely down the coast of East
Africa through the Cape of Good Hope and up the coast of West Africa. Before
considering whether the closure of the canal was a frustrating supervening event
in law, the court observed that the contract in question was a sale contract not
a carriage contract. Properly construed, the subject matter of the contract was
the delivery of goods and documents CIF Hamburg; it did not matter to the con-
tract of sale which route was taken. On that basis, the supervening event was
not relevant to the contract in question17. It thus follows that had the contract
in question was the carriage (say, a voyage charterparty) which had clearly antic-
ipated the use of the Suez Canal, that contract could be said to have been frus-
trated. This case shows quite explicitly how important it is to ascertain the sub-
ject matter of the contract before embarking on the inquiry as to whether there
is a frustrating event. Similarly in the so-called frustration of purpose cases18,
English law also undertakes first an inquiry as to what that purpose is from a
construction of the contract and its factual matrix. However, subjective intent
as always in English law is not deemed legally relevant. What matters is the pre-
sumed intention of the parties to be ascertained from the four corners of the con-
tract and the known and ascertainable factual matrix19 (the assumption being
that an individual’s subjective state of mind is not easily ascertainable).
6. Secondly, as to the issue of contractual solutions to changed circumstances,
the courts have always been prepared to give effect to the presumed intention of
the parties20. There are naturally particular challenges to the court – there is no
15 C. PEDAMON & J. CHUAH, supra, n. 7 at Chapter 3.
16 1962, A.C., 93.
17 The court however went on to hold that even if the route was relevant to the contract, the contract
could not be said to have been frustrated because the closure did not make it impossible for the ship
to get from Port Sudan to Hamburg, merely [a lot] more economically burdensome.
18 Often best illustrated by the British coronation cases arising out of the events surrounding the corona-
tion of King Edward VII and Queen Alexandra in 1902 such as Krell v. Henry, 1903, 2, KB, 740.
19 Prenn v. Simmonds ,1971, 1, WLR, 1381.
20 The Marine Star, 1996, 2, Lloyd’s Rep, 383.
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complete cure for poor drafting and a professionally minded court would
always render itself constrained by the words used and although would go
beyond the literal reading of the contract, the judge would not re-write the con-
tract21. Moreover, the court is required to consider the factual matrix when
interpreting the contract22 – in shipping and trade, that can easily pose factual
and evidentiary challenges.
Roman law based systems have long been influenced by the notion that contrac-
tus qui habent tractum successivum et depentiam de future rebus sic stantibus
intelliguntur23. It is not unexpectedly therefore for a conclusion to be drawn that
the roots of the doctrine of hardship or changed circumstances as an excusatory
factor had long existed in the civilian legal tradition. However, it should also not
be forgotten that in the period of the European enlightenment and scientific
positivism in the 18th century, the notion of pacta sunt servanda gradually took
hold24 and although there are variations between the different European
systems, the principle of the sanctity of contract prevailed and contractual per-
formance is not easily forgiven on some vague notion of ‘fairness’. In the wake
of World War I, the Roman law notion doctrine was however resurrected under
different names to cope with the drastic economic changes experienced, espe-
cially in Germany, but continental courts in the French legal tradition were
nevertheless reluctant to embrace the theory of imprévision (theory of unfore-
seeability or hardship). That rejection of the theory of imprévision is, for exam-
ple, properly codified in Article 1134 of the French Civil Code25. However the
rejection of imprévision does not mean that the courts would not permit some
relief to the parties. For instance, it has been considered that the requirement
that the performance is to be made in good faith might allow for some excusa-
tory defence or at the very least, the opportunity to adapt or renegotiate the
contract26. This is borne out by the fact that France and related systems, such as
the Belgian Civil Code27, the recognition of a duty of good faith in the perfor-
mance of contracts implies a degree of collaboration and cooperation. It should
21 Antaios Cia Naviera SA v. Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios), 1985, A.C., 191.
22 Reardon Smith v. Hanen-Tangen, 1976, WLR, 989; The Karen Oltman, 1976, 2, Lloyds Rep, 708.
23 Translated loosely as contracts providing for successive acts of performance over a future period of
time must be understood as subject to the condition that circumstances will remain the same.
24 See A.T. SALIBA, “Rebus sic stantibus: A comparative survey, E law”, Murdoch University Electronic
Journal of Law, Vol. 8, Number 3 (September 2001).
25 Art. 1134 of the French Civil Code – “Contracts legally entered into have the legal effect of law for
those who made them. They can only be terminated by the mutual will, or for the causes authorised
by law. They must be performed in good faith.”
26 See for example Belgian Cour de Cassation’s reading of the French theory in the Scafom-case (para 9
of the decision).
27 See Belgian Civil Code art. 1134(3) C.civ.
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not be outside a syllogistic reasoning that the cooperative spirit entailed the
renegotiation of the original agreement.
It is outside the scope of this article to examine whether systems of law based on
the French civil code are moving towards an acceptance of imprévision; that is
a subject best left to the experts in the civilian tradition. The emphasis in this
article to demonstrate, quite simply, that whether or not there is a wholehearted
acceptance of imprévision, the various legal systems have adopted renegotiation
of contracts as a valid relief. That said, some commentators have argued that
there has been a move in the French system to accept imprévision and as a result,
the imposition of a duty to renegotiate has followed28.
7. In the French legal tradition and related jurisdictions, the test as to whether
renegotiation is called for as a result of changed circumstances is always whether
the intervening or supervening event has changed the economic balance or equi-
librium of the contract29. As could be seen in the discussion above, this
approach based around the equilibrium of the contract is not adopted in the
English common law. Also, it should be remembered that the French court might
be prepared to order renegotiation or adaption if it is positively convinced that
that is consistent with the general precept of good faith; it would exercise that
power whether or not there exists a clause in the contract dealing with changed
circumstances or renegotiation30. It might also be noted that various projects
have recommended for a judicially guided process of renegotiation as consistent
with the precept of good faith31.
8. In Germany, there was also a recognition of pacta sunt servanda in the early
years of the modern legal system but from 1918, the German courts began invok-
ing § 275 BGB32 and extending the idea of general impossibility to include ‘eco-
nomic impossibility’ (wirtschaftliche Unmöglichkeit). The emphasis was on
28 M. BOUTONNET, “L’obligation de renégocier le contrat au nom de la lutte contre les gaz à effet de
serre”, D., notes, No. 16 (2008).
29 See generally D. PHILLIPE, “French and Belgian Reports” in E. HONDIUS and H.C. GRIGOLEIT (eds.),
supra, n. 7, at 144-163; in the case of Belgium, see Cass. 30 October 1924, Pas. 1924, I, 565; H. DE
PAGE, Traité élémentaire de droit civil belge, II, Brussel, Bruylant, 1964, 560.
30 See Novacarb v. Socoma Nancy (2eme ch.com), 26 September 2007, D. 2008.1120, Note M. BOU-
TONNET, RDC 2008.738, obs. D. MAZEAUD; also, for example TGI Paris 16 November 1988, Gaz.Pal.
1989; RTD Civ 1990.275, obs. J. MESTRE.
31 Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et du droit de la prescription, Arts. 1135-1 to 1135-
3, available at: www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/docfra/rapport_telechargement/var/storage/rap-
ports-publics/054000622/0000.pdf, 19 September 2012. See also F. TERRÉ, “Pour une réforme du
droit des contrats”, D. 2008, 23, Art. 92.
32 That article provides: “The obligor may be excused for the non-performance of his obligation when
this performance becomes impossible further to a circumstance arising since the conclusion of the
contract and for which he is not responsible.”
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 5 / 2
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
120
whether performance of the contract posed ‘an extraordinary difficulty’33
(unreasonable burden) for the obligor due to supervening events (especially as
regards incidents when pre-war or post-war contracts which had become eco-
nomically burdensome to perform as a result of shortages in supply and/or hyper-
inflation. However, as times became economically more stable, it quickly rec-
ognised that this concept was too vague and uncertain and the remedy provided,
namely the right to terminate the contract, was simply too blunt34. An important
threshold in the timeline is the Act of 26 November 2001, which came into force
on 1 January 2002, reforming German contract law comprehensively. The theory
of ‘Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage‘35 was codified in § 313 BGB with the head-
ing ‘Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage’ (change of circumstances)36. It states:
“(1) If circumstances upon which a contract was based have materi-
ally changed after conclusion of the contract and if the parties would
not have concluded the contract or would have done so upon different
terms if they had foreseen that change, adaptation of the contract may
be claimed in so far as, having regard to all the circumstances of the
specific case, in particular the contractual or statutory allocation of
risk, it cannot reasonably be expected that a party should continue to
be bound by the contract in its unaltered form.
(2) If material assumptions that have become the basis of the contract
subsequently turn out to be incorrect, they are treated in the same way
as a change in circumstances.
(3) If adaptation of the contract is not possible or cannot reasonably
be imposed on one party, the disadvantaged party may terminate the
contract. In the case of a contract for the performance of a recurring
obligation, the right to terminate is replaced by the right to terminate
on notice.”
The judicial remedy is not merely a right or duty to renegotiate the contract but
direct judicial adaption of the contract37, something which the courts in the
33 Das Festhalten am gegebenen Wort. Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts I – Allgemeiner Teil, Beck
14th ed., § 21c.
34 RG 8 February 1918, RGZ 93-341; RG 8 December 1920, RGZ 101-74; A. RIEG, “Le rôle de la
volonté dans l’acte juridique en droit civil français et allemande”, pref. R. PERROT, LGDJ 1961,
No. 531 & others.
35 Which is similar to the idea of frustration of purpose. See RG 3 February 1922, RGZ. 103-329; RG
3 March 1924, RGZ, 108-125; RG 4 February 1935, RGZ, 146-376.
36 § 313 BGB refers to ‘the contractual basis’ (Grundlage des Vertrags). This article has been translated
in English by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard Dannemann and is available at www.iuscomp.org/gla/
statutes/BGB.htm.
37 The Dutch Civil Code also provides for a similar judicial right to adaptation. (New Civil Code,
art. 6.5.3.11.).
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French and English traditions would conventionally resist. However, it should
not be ignored that this right to interfere in German law is largely constrained
by the requirement that the changed circumstances cause a serious disruption to
the equilibrium and that it would be ‘grossly unfair’ or contrary to good faith
and equity to not intervene38. That has resulted in a German court holding that
an increase of 300% in the price of the goods could not be relied on to free the
manufacturer from liability because they were fully aware of the huge price fluc-
tuations in that market and as seasoned traders in the sector they should have
foreseen that probability during their initial negotiations39.
It would appear that § 313(1) offers the aggrieved party a right to ask for the
contract to be adapted to meet the changed circumstances40 in the light of the
words “adaptation may be claimed in so far as … it cannot be reasonably expec-
ted that a party should continue to be bound by the contract in its unaltered
form”. It is however quite another matter to suggest that § 313 gives rise to a
right of renegotiation. The view at large was that § 313 merely offers the aggrie-
ved party a right to ask the court to adapt the contract41, it does not convey any
words providing for the right to call for the contract to be renegotiated. The
contrary position was however controversially adopted by the Bundesgerichts-
hof42. It ruled in a decision dated 30 September 2011 that “the right (of the
aggrieved party) to the adaptation of the contract obliges the other party to
cooperate to this adaptation.” That in turn naturally leads to renegotiations.
The court went on to state that a breach of this duty would fall within the scope
of § 280(1)43 and would therefore entitle the disadvantaged party to succeed in
a claim for damages. Be that as it may, it is consensus that the duty to cooperate
does not imply that the parties must reach an agreement. Failure to reach an
agreement would not therefore be a breach as long as the party in question had
entered into the renegotiations in good faith.
38 See C. PEDAMON and J. CHUAH, supra n. 7, at 28; also H. ROSLER, “Hardship in German Codified
Private Law – In Comparative Perspective to English, French and International Contract Law”, ERPL,
vol. 15, No. 4 (2007), 483.
39 The Oberlandesgericht Hamburg (28 February 1997, No. 167, CISG-online 261 cited by I. SCHWEN-
ZER, “Force majeure and Hardship in International Sale Contracts” 2008, 39, VUWLR, 709, 715).
40 Anspruch auf Anpassung des Vertrags.
41 TEICHMAN, BB 01.1491; B. DAUNER-LIEB, DOTSCH, NJW, 02.925; Jauernig/Stadler, § 313, BGB,
13 ed., No. 27 – Stadler states that the prevailing view rejects a duty to renegotiate under § 313 BGB.
42 For a criticism of the case, see TEICHMANN, BB 01.1491.
43 § 280 BGB – Damages for breach of duty – “(1) If the obligor breaches a duty arising from the obli-
gation, the obligee may demand damages for the damage caused thereby. This does not apply if the
obligor is not responsible for the breach of duty. (…).” Translation of the BGB available at
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p0828.
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9. In Italian law, the article in the Civil Code relating changed circumstances or
economic hardship is found in Article 1467.144. There is an important condi-
tionality in the application of this article. This article concerns only executory
contracts45 which, before performance is properly executed, the circumstances
change and that change causes excessive undue hardship for the obligor. The
changed circumstances should not have been within the predictable or foresee-
able risk of the contract or commercial venture. Italian jurisprudence suggests
that predictabiltiy is what the average man can foresee at the moment of the
agreement. These risks can be natural or human. They can be technical, eco-
nomic, political, normative46. These risks are different for each contract and
each case, and is therefore to an appreciable extent a question of fact for the
judge. It is likely the court would be guided by two factors. First, the level of
specificity of the risk of the occurrence, and, secondly, the level of probability
that that fact would occur. In that context, it would follow that the duration or
length of the contract is a significant factor. The longer the relationship, the
higher probability the intervening or supervening event would occur and thus
the commercial parties are expected to have made allowance or proper accom-
modation for that risk.
The remedy lies in the right for the disadvantaged party to petition the court for
termination of the contract. The party against whom the termination petition is
made can avoid it by offering an equitable modification or renegotiation (reduc-
tio ad equitatem) of the contract47. This adaptation or modification cannot be
asked for by the party who is suffering from the hardship and it cannot be ini-
tiated by the judge without the consent of the other party. It is especially note-
worthy that the reductio ad equitatem is not intended to re-establish the equili-
brium of the contractual relationship (unlike the UNIDROIT Principles) but
simply to remove the proportion of the risk which exceeds what was in the
original contemplation of the parties48. It is not always clear what is the scope
44 Art. 1467: Contracts to be performed permanently or periodically or to deferred execution, if the per-
formance of one of the parties has become prohibitively expensive for the occurrence of extraordinary
events and unpredictable, the party who is such a benefit can apply for termination of the contract, with
the effects established by Article 1458 (fl. 168).The resolution cannot be sought if the undue hardship
is considered as a normal risk of the contract. The party against whom the resolution is sought can
avoid it by offering to modify the conditions of the contract equitably (962, 1623, 1664, 1923).
45 As against cases where there was a mistake made as to the existence of the subject matter of the
contract, such as the goods in question etc.
46 Cass. 15 December 1984, No. 6574.
47 Art. 1467.3; see also GIANNATTASIO in Rassegna di Giurisprudenza sul Codice civile, art. 1467, No. 19
(ed. NICOLÒ-RICHTER, IV/III 1972).
48 For example the Court of Cassation said in an 1992 case: “[A]n offer of adaptation can be considered
equitable if it brings the contract to a situation that had it existed at the time of the conclusion of the
contract, the disadvantaged party would not have had the right to ask for termination.” (Cass 11 Jan-
uary 1992, No. 247, Giurisprudenza italiana, 1993, I, 1, 2018).
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of the judge’s powers when an equitable renegotiation proposal had been made.
In general terms, it would appear to be inappropriate for the judge to change the
offer49. However, there is some evidence that where the offer is inadequate, the
judge may, in exercise of his or her power of adaptation, suggest the scope of
what is equitable and fair in the circumstances50. It is submitted that it is not
entirely clear how an appropriate balance could be struck by the court in exer-
cise of this discretionary power, given the statutory requirement that the propo-
sal should be a prerogative of the person against whom dissolution or termina-
tion of the contract had been sought.
It has been argued that Italian jurisprudence should permit a right to be confer-
red on the disadvantaged party to seek a renegotiation of the contract, instead
of dissolution51. However, in practical terms, it might be suggested that when
the other party is threatened with a petition for dissolution they would be quite
prepared52 (as in cases of shipping contracts and charterparties53) to salvage the
relationship given the severely depressed or inflated market conditions. That
would then serve as the catalyst for a judicially guided renegotiation exercise.
There are clearly practical challenges too especially when a court is involved.
Delay and additional costs which may ultimately lead still to dissolution of the
relationship cannot be understated.
3. The Challenges of a Transnational Problem for Shipping and 
Commerce
Thus far we have seen the different approaches to the concept of changed cir-
cumstances, economic hardship and the remedies in national law (judicial adap-
tation, renegotiation and hybrid models). In international shipping the challen-
ges of a diverse legal background are especially pronounced. Perhaps a case
might be used to illustrate the point.
49 Cass. 29 June 1981, No. 4249, Foro italiano, 1981, I, 2133.
50 Cass. 18 July 1989, No. 3347, Foro italiano, 1990, I, 565. See also E. ZACCARRIA, “The Effects of
Changed Circumstances in International Commercial Trade”, 2004, International Trade and Business
Law Review, 6.
51 R. SACCO and G. DE NOVA, Il Contratto (2nd edn, Turin, Utet, 1993) 685-86; P. GALLO, “Eccessiva
onerosità sopravvenuta e problemi di gestione del contratto in diritto comparato”, 1991, VII, sez civ,
Digesto, IV 244; Criscuolo, 71-79.
52 There are of course exceptions to this commercial expedience, such as where the party with the advan-
tage is under the impression that the disadvantaged party is likely to be able to meet the originally
agreed obligation (e.g. financially stronger than they make out).
53 See above.
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10. In Ravennavi S.P.A. v. Handitankers54 the M/T Ionian Wave, an oil tanker,
was under charter to an Italian company for a period of 24 months in 2008.
Hire was set at USD22,000 a day55. As most readers would know, in the second
half of 2009 market conditions collapsed. In consequence, the market rate fell
to around USD11,000 a day. The contract did not provide for the adjustment of
hire under such circumstances. However, as to be expected the charterer insti-
gated discussions with the owner to renegotiate more favourable terms. The
charterer argued that the collapse in market conditions meant that the hire was
unsustainable and those unforeseeable and extraordinary circumstances could
spell its financial insolvency.
In November 2009 the charterer commenced legal proceedings in Ravenna
against the owner claiming that the latter was in breach of the general good-
faith rule under Article 1375 of the Italian Civil Code and Articles 6.2.2 and
6.2.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles56 by refusing to renegotiate. In filing the writ
of summons, the charterer also filed a claim for damages against the owner in
the event of the owner withdrawing the vessel. The owner argued that the Italian
court lacked jurisdiction, citing the English arbitration clause contained in the
charterparty. It also argued in the alternative that it was not under any duty to
renegotiate the terms of the charter. At the same time, the owner commenced
arbitration proceedings in London against the charterer seeking the payment of
unpaid hire until the date of withdrawal of the ship, quantum meruit plus
expenses incurred from the date of withdrawal until the final discharge of the
cargo and damages for repudiatory breach57. The charterer refused to appear in
the arbitration proceedings and the London arbitrators issued an award allo-
wing the owner’s claims.
Before the Court of Ravenna, the charterer responding to the jurisdictional
defence raised by the owner on the grounds of the London arbitration clause,
argued that its demands for suspension of payment of hire and for damages were
based on general principles of the law of good faith and undue hardship, and
that such principles derive directly from the law, not from the charter, being
principles of public policy. They also assert that these principles which have been
incorporated into the UNIDROIT Principles and Article 2 of the Italian Consti-
54 Court of Appeal, Ravenna, Italy (Judgment of 19 May 2011); www.internationallawoffice.com/
Newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=ad5bfabf-eb86-4ccf-a79d-3ed7497868e7.
55 Plus or minus 15 days at the charterer’s option.
56 Principles for International Commercial Contracts.
57 Which was equal to the difference between the hire payable for the unexpired part of the charter at
the rate of USD 22,000 a day and the assessed market rate for the vessel during the same period at the
rate of USD 11,000 a day.
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tution, obliged the parties to act in good faith and to renegotiate the terms of a
contract whenever a situation of undue hardship occurs.
11. It is immediately obvious that a claim for relief in the light of changed cir-
cumstances in transnational commercial contracts (especially shipping con-
tracts) which not only contained foreign arbitration and jurisdiction clauses, but
also depended on where the security of the assets (vessel, cargo or bank
accounts) is located, raises challenging issues of jurisdiction and practical relief.
In the present case, the Italian court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction
because of the arbitration clause. It was also accepted that it was trite principle
in English law that undue hardship would not lead to a right of renegotiation or
adaptation. That said, it should be observed that under Italian law, the right to
renegotiate under these circumstances may not be as clear as the charterer had
hoped. Although the matter was never decided given the point of lack of juris-
diction, it is tantalising that in Italian jurisprudence that the right to renegotiate
is narrowly construed and must operate within the scope of the Civil Code58.
The omission of the parties to insert a hardship clause makes it all the more
problematic.
The observations to be drawn from an example like this (which is not uncom-
mon in international shipping) are that conflict of laws points will always make
the issue of what law applies vexing. However, there is a more problematic issue
around conflict of laws. It is whether the principles on hardship, good faith,
renegotiation and adaptation are mandatory rules59 (whether of the lex fori or
the forum with the closest connection to the contract) which would impact on
the application of the applicable law of the contract. In Ravennavi S.P.A. v.
Handitankers60 the charterer was asserting that in law, not contract, the requi-
rement to renegotiate was of a fundamental nature.
Another is the clear aversion the charterer felt for subjecting its legal relati-
onship to the scrutiny of English law – it seems fairly incontrovertible that the
English common law’s laissez-faire approach to economic hardship in contract
58 See above.
59 Art. 3 of the Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contracts (Rome I Regulation) provides:
(3) Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in a country
other than the country whose law has been chosen, the choice of the parties shall not prejudice the
application of provisions of the law of that other country which cannot be derogated from by agree-
ment. (4) Where all other elements relevant to the situation at the time of the choice are located in one
or more Member States, the parties’ choice of applicable law other than that of a Member State shall
not prejudice the application of provisions of Community law, where appropriate as implemented in
the Member State of the forum, which cannot be derogated from by agreement.
60 Supra, n. 54.
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law is infamous. This article seeks to trace certain more recent developments in
English law which might be interpreted by some as evincing a more prepared-
ness to admit an element of adaptation or modification as a remedy. It will be
argued that in many a case, these are merely a pragmatic attempt to find relief
in a doctrinal tradition founded on ideas of laissez-faire. Doctrinal challenges
continue to pose a serious challenge.
A third observation is that national laws are not a reliable prophylactic against
economic hardship or changed circumstances. Contractual devices are perhaps
the more effective control. In our Italian case example, it was clear that the
charterer’s position would have been greatly enhanced had there been a
hardship clause. A casual reader might legitimately ask why in a legally forma-
lised sector like international shipping these clauses are not the norm. Indeed.
4. New and Emerging Issues for the Right or Duty to Renegotiate
12. As stated earlier, the effectiveness and utility of a contractual remedy of
renegotiation depends very much on how accommodating the relevant applica-
ble law is to the contractual provision. That accommodation cannot be over-
stated or presumed, even in legal systems where the right to renegotiate terms is
prescribed as legal remedy. Taking the German law, for example, although the
parties are required to renegotiate the agreement in the event of changed circum-
stances constituting hardship, there is legal requirement that the contract must
be saved. Where the parties renegotiated in good faith but a satisfactory out-
come could not be arrived, the parties are free to walk away. There is a dearth
of literature in German jurisprudence how the courts of law should be involved,
especially, whether and to what extent, they should guide and influence the rene-
gotiation. In civilian systems where there might conceivably exist such a right
either in general jurisprudence (such as concepts of good faith and fair dealing)
or in the civil codes, similar issues of judicial influence and guidance can surface.
In many a case, such as in Italy, the preference for the court is to be reticent
unless there is present a properly incorporated hardship clause61. The reliance
on good faith as the premise for the duty to renegotiate raises the principle of
nemo locupletari potest cum aliena iactura where makes it clear that no party
can be enriched at the expense of the other party62. That principle makes it all
the more difficult for an Italian tribunal to ascertain the appropriate balance in
61 There is some authority to suggest that the Italian court can intervene and adapt the contract if the
renegotiation fails (Cass., Sez. un. 13 settembre 2005, No. 18128).
62 See art. 2041 Civil Code.
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the renegotiation exercise – commercial balance63 is notoriously difficult to
determine, especially, for non-commercial party such as a judge. Even reliance
on third party expert or surveyors is not especially helpful, given that in most
western systems of law there is no requirement for the consideration or price of
the promise to be adequate. In shipping where the bargaining strengths of the
parties are similar and there is a high degree of speculation in the transactions,
the question as to the right balance to be achieved following an intervention of
untoward economic events is virtually impossible to measure. That lack of cer-
tainty, despite the provisions in the law which attempt to create a new and fair
equilibrium, has led commercial parties to rely on hardship clauses instead64.
In English common law doctrine, there is no right to renegotiate without a
properly enforceable hardship clause. However there have been certain interes-
ting developments which both tantalise and frustrates the lawyer as to the direc-
tion of travel in English law.
5. Hybrids of Good Faith?
5.1. Duty to Mitigate and Agreed Damages Clauses
Liquidated damages or agreed damages clauses are commonplace in shipping –
the demurrage clause, for example, is a classical liquidated damages clause. Why
would a liquidated damages clause be relevant in the case of economic hardship
or changed circumstances? It is entirely conceivable that given the strictures
English law places around economic hardship, the failure of one party to per-
form the contract because of economic hardship will invariably be treated as a
repudiatory breach. The other party is not required by law to accept the repudi-
atory breach65; it is entitled simply to claim the amount of compensation set by
the liquidated damages clause.
13. Against this backdrop is the oft-cited duty to mitigate rule. The English rules
governing mitigation of damages for breach of contract are well established.
However, despite the common use of the phrase ‘duty to mitigate’, in the
63 In many situations reference needs to be had to industry practice or the business community (Cass.
8 febbraio 1982, No. 722, in Foro it. 1982, I, c. 2285.).
64 In Ravennavi S.P.A. v. Handitankers (supra n. 54) the absence of a hardship clause made the claim
substantially more challenging.
65 It is settled law in England and Wales that a repudiatory breach of contract does not automatically
bring the primary obligations of the parties to perform the contract to an end. Rather, it gives the
innocent party a choice whether to accept the repudiation as terminating the contract or whether to
keep the contract in force: see e.g. Geys v. Société Générale, 2013, 1, A.C., 523; also MSC Mediterra-
nean Shipping Co SA v. Cottonex Anstal, 2015, EWHC, 283 (Comm) at para 89.
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absence of a contrary agreement a claimant is free to act as it wishes following
a breach of contract by the defendant and does not owe any obligation to the
defendant to mitigate its loss66. However, the general principle is that the dam-
ages recoverable for a breach of contract are to be calculated as if the claimant
had acted reasonably to mitigate its loss67. This is actually the properly so-called
‘mitigation principle’. The burden of proof is on the defendant to show that
there were steps available to the claimant to take which would have avoided all
or an identifiable part of its loss, and that it is reasonable to expect that someone
in the claimant’s position would have taken those steps68. The standard of rea-
sonableness to be applied is not an exacting one having regard to the fact that
the claimant’s predicament has been caused by the defendant’s wrongdoing69.
14. In the recent case of MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v. Cottonex
Anstal70 an unusual turn of events arose. The consignee of raw cotton refused
to take delivery of the goods when the ship arrived at Chittagong. The price of
raw cotton had collapsed in 2011 making it uneconomic for the consignee to
pay for the goods. The containers were then placed within Bangladeshi Cus-
toms’ control and a release was not possible without certain fees being made.
The shipper and the carrier had entered into a contract of carriage evidenced by
several bills of lading. Incorporated in the contract is a ‘container demurrage’
clause. Maritime transport lawyers will appreciate that these clauses are a fairly
recent phenomenon. They basically provide that if the containers used by the
shipper are not returned to the carrier within a number of ‘free days’, the shipper
will have pay a sum of money for every day the containers are returned late.
Under the circumstances, the shipper in the Cottonex case were unable to
retrieve the containers without undue inconvenience and expense. Similarly, the
carrier was unwilling to retrieve them given that the ship had by then already
left port and like the shipper would have had to pay Bangladeshi customs to col-
lect the containers. By the time the case went to court, the container demurrage
accrued totalled over USD1m which was at least ten times the cost of the con-
tainers. The carrier insisted that the container demurrage must be paid per con-
tract. If the letter of the law is to be adhered to, although MSC did not suffer
66 See e.g. Darbishire v. Warran, 1963, 1, WLR, 1067, 1075; Sotiros Shipping Inc v. Samiet Solholt (The
‘Solholt’), 1983, 1, Lloyd’s Rep, 605, 608.
67 Golden Strait Corp v. Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The ‘Golden Victory), 2007, 2, A.C., 353,
370, para 10.
68 Roper v. Johnson, 1873, LR 8 CP 167; Standard Chartered Bank v. Pakistan National Shipping Corp,
2001, 1, All ER (Comm) 822 at para 38.
69 Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow & Sons Ltd, 1932, A.C., 452, 506. See also MSC Mediterranean
Shipping Co SA v. Cottonex Anstal, 2015, EWHC, 283 (Comm).
70 Ibid.
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any real financial loss, they were entitled to claim the demurrage as provided in
the contract as long as the demurrage did not constitute a penalty71.
The Commercial Court held that MSC should not have refused to accept the
repudiatory breach – it had no legitimate reason72 to refuse. As a result, it was
not entitled to rely on the container demurrage clause. The court went further
to say that in the light of a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada, Bhasin v.
Hrynew73 the common law should no longer be resistant to a general precept of
good faith which could be applied with limited judicial discretion to prevent one
party from acting entirely in its own self-interest. The court did not have to rely
on this proposition to decide against MSC; there is sufficient scope to reason
that a demurrage clause with unlimited duration could amount to a penalty and
therefore was unenforceable.
15. It is sometimes an appropriate commercial option for one party to terminate
the contract instead of seeking renegotiation. In another recent case, Isabella
Shipowner SA v. Shagang Shipping Co Ltd (The Aquafaith)74, the time charterer
redelivered the ship early because of serious economic hardship caused by the
highly volatile charter market between 2009 and 2011. As we have seen above,
a shipowner in these circumstances is confronted with two options: to maintain
the charter and insist on the charterer’s performance, or to terminate immedi-
ately. In MSC v. Cottonex, J. Leggatt was concerned that there was no legitimate
reason for maintaining the status quo. In The Aquafaith, on the other hand, J.
Cooke held that in certain circumstances it would be acceptable for the ship-
owner to maintain the charter and to continue to invoice the charterer for the
71 A sum in terrorem or penalty is unenforceable in English law (see Makdessi v. Cavendish Square
Holdings BV, 2013, EWCA Civ, 1539, 2014, 2, All ER (Comm), 125) where it was held that a sum
is not a penalty just because it is payable in a variety of circumstances in some of which it will or may
exceed the loss caused by the breach. However, if the sum is extravagant and out of all proportion to
the loss likely to be incurred (or the greatest loss which could be incurred) in all or many or a signifi-
cant category of cases, this may indicate that it is a penalty. A liquidated damages will not be regarded
as a penalty if there is a commercial justification for it.) In France, the courts may lessen the agreed
liquidated damages when they appear to be manifestly excessive. The French courts will consider the
excessive nature of the stipulated damages compared to the absence of loss or damages actually suf-
fered as well as the overall value of the contract. They may appoint an independent expert to help with
the assessment of the actual damages suffered to determine if the liquidated damages are manifestly
excessive. The courts’ power to decrease (and increase) the stipulated damages may not be modified
or excluded by contract. (see http://globalarbitrationreview.com/know-how/topics/73/jurisdictions/
28/france/). In Germany, § 343 BGB allows the court or arbitral tribunal to adjust any liquidated
damages or penalty clause taking into account the nature of the respective obligation, the interest of
the relevant party and the proportionality of the financial impact. Such an option is applied with
restraint as regards commercial entities.
72 It should be noted that there is no consensus in English law that such a principle of legitimate interest
actually exists; it is hoped that if the decision is appealed, that point could be clarified by the appellate
court/s.
73 2014, SCC 71.
74 2012, EWHC, 1077 (Comm).
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hire due up to the earliest redelivery date under the charter. It should of course
be noted that by keeping the contract alive, the ship must be continually ready
to take orders from the charterer as required by the charter. That means if the
charter could not be kept alive without the charterer’s help, the owner should
essentially accept the termination and claim compensation. If it does not, it runs
the risk of committing a breach of the charterparty if it is unable to meet any
new instruction from the charterer (who for whatever reason changes its mind
and resumes using the vessel).
In that case, the court considered that the contract in question was a time charter
where a greater degree of cooperation is not required from the defaulting party
to maintain the contract. In a time charter (such as the one in question, an NYPE
form), the owner is not dependent on the charterer and it does not require the
charterer’s assistance in continuing to instruct the vessel to maintain its position
and perform any service required, despite a lack of orders or payment from the
charterer.
16. From a commercial perspective, whilst in the short term it might be attrac-
tive for the owners to keep the charter alive, in the long run, if the court finds
that there is no legitimate reason for maintaining the charter, any claim in com-
pensation could be reduced considerably because of the mitigation principle75.
It also runs the risk of the charterer becoming insolvent (given the economic
hardship conditions, that is not inconceivable) and thereby unable to pay any
form of compensation.
Another matter which has been the subject of controversy in recent times is
when is non or late payment a repudiatory breach. In challenging economic
times, charterers and other sub-contractors may try to renegotiate their freight
or hire rates. Often this is preceded by several failures to pay or late payments.
In English law, it must be recalled that unless specifically stipulated in the con-
tract, non-payment is not a condition of the contract76. In general law, it is a
mere breach of warranty which means a failure to pay would not be treated as
a repudiatory breach. It would only be a repudiatory breach if the pattern of late
payments or non-payment evinces an intention by the defaulting party not to
75 See above.
76 The Brimnes, 1972, 2, Lloyd’s Rep, 465; though see controversial obiter dicta of J. FLAUX in The
Astra, 2013, EWHC, 865. Note that The Astra was not followed recently in Spar Shipping AS v.
Grand China Logistics Holding (Group) Co. Ltd, 2015, EWHC, 718 (Comm) which held that pay-
ment of charter hire is not a condition of the contract.
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carry on with the contract77. As is immediately obvious, that is a most challen-
ging question of fact for any tribunal!
Early redelivery as a result of hardship is not something owners should take
lightly. There has been a steady chain of cases before the English courts on pre-
cisely this problem. In the final analysis, owners must make a commercially sen-
sible decision – it is not always clear what that should be in the English law
context. However, The Aquafaith offers some instruction as to what factors
would influence the court’s approach.
5.2. An Implied Term of Good Faith?
17. Reading the MSC v. Cottonex judgment alongside another recent case, Yam
Seng v. International Trade Corporation Limited78 one finds evidence that some
English judges are gradually more prepared to consider good faith as a factor in
the performance of contracts, if not as a general principle79. In Yam Seng the
parties had entered into a distributorship agreement for sporting goods. It was
alleged that one party had deliberately caused various disruptions to the perfor-
mance of the contract. The question was whether there was an implied term of
good faith which had been breached. The court held that it was wrong to assume
that English law did not imply a term of good faith in contracts; it was pointed
out that in certain contracts, such as contracts of employment or contracts
involving fiduciaries, necessitated the implication of good faith as a term or
promise in the contract. Applying what is a general test of implication of terms,
the court held that for proper business efficacy of the commercial relationship,
good faith in the performance of the contract should necessarily be implied into
the contract in question. The judge, J. Leggatt, said80:
“The modern case law on the construction of contracts has empha-
sised that contracts, like all human communications, are made against
77 Januzaj v. Valilas, 2014, EWCA Civ, 436.
78 2013, EWHC, 111 (QB); decided by J. LEGGATT, the same judge in the MSC v. Cottonex-case.
79 It is well known that there is no legal principle of good faith of general application in English law (see
Chitty on Contract Law (31st Ed.), Vol. 1, para 1-039). In this regard the following observations of
L.J. BINGHAM (as he then was) in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd,
1989, 1, QB, 433 at 439 are often quoted: “In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal
systems outside the common law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding
principle that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not
simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal system must recog-
nise; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical colloquialisms as ‘playing fair’,
‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards face upwards on the table.’ It is in essence a principle of fair open
dealing… English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has
developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness.”
80 At paras 133-135.
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a background of unstated shared understandings which inform their
meaning. The breadth of the relevant background and the fact that it
has no conceptual limits have also been stressed, particularly in the
famous speech of Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme
Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at
pp. 912-3, as further explained in BCCI v. Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 at
p. 269.
Importantly for present purposes, the relevant background against
which contracts are made includes not only matters of fact known to
the parties but also shared values and norms of behaviour. Some of
these are norms that command general social acceptance; others may
be specific to a particular trade or commercial activity; others may be
more specific still, arising from features of the particular contractual
relationship. Many such norms are naturally taken for granted by the
parties when making any contract without being spelt out in the doc-
ument recording their agreement.
A paradigm example of a general norm which underlies almost all
contractual relationships is an expectation of honesty. That expecta-
tion is essential to commerce, which depends critically on trust. Yet it
is seldom, if ever, made the subject of an express contractual obliga-
tion. Indeed if a party in negotiating the terms of a contract were to
seek to include a provision which expressly required the other party
to act honestly, the very fact of doing so might well damage the par-
ties’ relationship by the lack of trust which this would signify.”
It is clear that although J. Leggatt did not pronounce that there was a general
legal duty of good faith, The judge was unequivocal that it was proper to imply
a term that the contracting parties should behave with honesty and decency
towards each other. In the common law, unlike the civil law, the distinction
between what is legal and what is contractual is significant. The former means
that it is much harder to avoid, qualify or delimit by contract than the latter.
Also, a breach of a legal rule is likely to be fundamental and would thus consti-
tute a repudiatory breach. A repudiatory breach, as against a breach of a mere
warranty, would entitle the other party to bring an end to the contract.
18. There are two particular issues arising from these developments. First, it has
to be said that whether there exists an implied term of good faith is very fact
dependent and cannot be presumed to exist in every commercial transaction.
Secondly, even in the circumstances where there is to be found a term of good
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faith, the parameters of that term in the given case are not such that there is a
further implied duty to renegotiate the deal when faced with changed circum-
stances or hardship.
It is quite clear that although J. Leggatt reasoned that it was to swim against the
tide to resist the introduction of some general81 good faith element into English
contract law, the judge went a long way but did not go so far as to say that it
was general principle of law. Instead, the finding that there was an implied term
of good faith depended heavily on the fact that the distributorship agreement
was founded on an expectation of honesty and fair dealing between the parties.
The fact that the distributorship was virtually exclusive in the context of the
goods in question suggested a strong dependency by one party on the other to
make the commercial purpose succeed. Indeed, it is becoming fairly clear that
the nature of (inter-)dependency in the contractual relationship has a strong
influence on any findings of legitimate expectation and, consequently, a duty of
good faith82.
19. The other observation to be made is that Yam Seng was simply about the
duty to act by one contracting party toward the other in decency and honesty.
It was not about whether one had to extend themselves beyond the pre-existing
relationship to renegotiate a new contract when that relationship is jeopardised
by changed circumstances or economic hardship. As to whether there is such an
implied term depends on the so-called business efficacy test. That test was
described by Lord Wright as a term “of which it can be predicated that ‘it goes
without saying’, some term not expressed but necessary to give the transaction
such business efficacy as the parties must have intended.”83. The test is strictly
applied – namely that the courts would not re-write the contracts simply because
it is reasonable to do so84. Indeed, as Lord Simond said, the process of implying
a term is one “against the abuse of which the courts must keep constant
guard”85. Moreover, there is case law to suggest that where the relationship had
been reduced to a detailed written agreement as in many shipping and trade
81 English law has always recognised a piecemeal approach to ‘good faith’. See L.J. Bingham’s dicta in
supra n. 79.
82 See for example The Aquafaith (supra n. 74).
83 Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v. Cooper, 1941, A.C., 108 at 137. In some case law, it had also been said
that all implied terms (not only those implied by fact but also those implied by law and those implied
by custom, which falls outside the scope of our discussion) are subject to some requirement of ‘neces-
sity’ (see for example Anderson v. Corp. of Lloyd’s (No. 2), 1992, 1, Lloyds Rep, 620 at 627; Hughes
v. Greenwich L.B.C., 1994, A.C., 170 at 179; Baker v. Black Sea & Baltic Insurance Co. Ltd., 1998,
1, WLR, 974 at 980.
84 Reigate v. Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd, 1918, 1, KB, 592 at 605; The Mammoth Pine,
1986, 3, All ER, 767 at 770; McAuley v. Bristol C.C., 1992, QB, 134 at 146.
85 Scruttons Ltd v. Midland Silicones Ltd, 1962, A.C., 446 at 467.
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cases the presumed intention of the parties is not to allow for the introduction
of new terms or promises86.
20. It has to be borne in mind that the traditional approach has been to use the
implied term device to fill gaps in the contract. It is highly debatable as to
whether the need to save the contract in the event of hardship is a ‘gap’ which
the parties are presumed to have intended for the courts to fill. That is quite dis-
similar to the scenario in Yam Seng – there the duty of good faith to be implied
related to the fact that one party had deliberately misled the other about the
legal, commercial and logistical issues and had repeatedly missed deadlines for
supplying the goods (where time had not been made of the essence). The Yam
Seng scenario was thus about performance of the contract; renegotiation, it
might be said, is not.
Knowledge of the parties as to the potential ‘gap’ is often relevant. The implied
term device also depends on what is commonly known as the ‘officious bystan-
der’ test. That test was espoused by LJ MacKinnon in these terms: “Prima facie
that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is
something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if while the parties
were making their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express
provision for it in the agreement, they would testily suppress him with a com-
mon ‘Oh, of course!’”87. That suggests that unless it is a matter which is within
the parties’ scope of contemplation or knowledge, for a court to introduce a new
duty would essentially be to re-write the contract. A commercial sale case might
prove relevant here. In K.C. Sethia Ltd v. Partabmull Rameshwar88 the sellers
of Indian jute to Italian buyers were unable to perform their contractual duty
because they failed to obtain a quota for shipment to Italy. They argued that a
term should be implied in their contract that performance was subject to quota.
The argument was rejected, inter alia, on the basis that the buyers did not know
that the sellers did not originally have a quota for Italian shipment. The scope
of the buyers’ knowledge was an important factor – the officious bystander test
could not be satisfied because if the officious bystander were to suggest to the
parties at the time the contract was negotiated to provide for quota restrictions,
the buyers would certainly say “what’s that?” instead of an “Oh of course!”
because the quota matter would have been unknown to them at that time.
86 Shell UK Ltd v. Lostock Garages Ltd, 1976, 1, WLR, 1187; The Maira (No. 3), 1988, 2, Lloyds Rep,
126 (reversed on other grounds).
87 Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd, 1939, 2, KB, 206 at 227 (affirmed, 1940, A.C., 701).
88 195, 1, All ER, 51.
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21. Another implied term device which might be relevant to the discussion
around hardship and renegotiation, is the implied duty of cooperation. This
controversial aspect of English law has also in recent times seen renewed judicial
activity.
The idea of a duty to cooperate in commercial contracts was more or less esta-
blished by the House of Lords in the Victorian age in Mackay v. Dick89. That
case concerned the sale of a digging machine, a term of the contract being that
delivery would be accepted if the machine is able to meet the guaranteed perfor-
mance. However, the buyer refused to test the machine thereby preventing the
completion of the contract. The House of Lords referred to a passage in Bell’s
Principles90 (§ 50): “If the debtor bound under a certain condition have impeded
or prevented the event, it is held as accomplished. If the creditor had done all
that he can to fulfil a condition which is incumbent on himself, it is held suffi-
cient implement.” The House of Lords held that there was thus a doctrine, bor-
rowed from the civil law, that the buyer was under a duty to pay damages to the
seller for its refusal to allow the contract to be performed. There are two preli-
minary observations – one is that the case involves the law of Scotland which
has civilian roots and the other is that the word ‘cooperation’ was not used by
the judgment.
22. That said, it is undeniable that more recent English cases have taken the line
that Mackay v. Dick is good authority for the finding of an implied term of
cooperation91. In Swallowfalls Ltd v. Monaco Yachting & Technologies S.A.M.
& Anor92 a shipbuilding contract had been entered into whereby the purchase
price of €35,231,600 was to be paid over 11 instalments following certain spec-
ified milestones in the shipbuilding process. The builder ran into financial diffi-
culties and it was agreed between the builder and the buyer that the buyer would
provide interim finance for the builder. The amounts would then be gradually
set-off against the payment of the instalments. Disputes followed and the buyer
sought to recover the balance of the loan. The court held that the buyer must
cooperate with the builder by signing any certificates confirming the specific
milestones in the shipbuilding process so that payment would be properly trig-
gered. This part of the judgment is perhaps not especially controversial if we
89 1881, 6 App. Cas, 251.
90 Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 10th ed., 1899.
91 See for example Mona Oil Equipment Ltd v. Rhodesia Railways Ltd (1949), 83, Ll.L.Rep., 178 and
London Borough of Merton v. Stanley Hugh Leach Ltd (1985), 32, BLR, 51; also, even more recently,
Swallowfalls Ltd v. Monaco Yachting & Technologies S.A.M. & Anor, 2014, EWCA Civ, 186.
92 Ibid.
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accept that there is a duty of cooperation. What was highly problematic is this
passage in LJ Longmore’s judgment:
“The … proposed implied term is an ordinary implication in any con-
tract for the performance of which co-operation is required. A ship-
building contract is such a contract since, as Mr Hofmeyr points out,
the builder only earns a stage payment when the buyer’s representa-
tive signs a certificate that the relevant stage or milestone has been
achieved. If the relevant milestone has in fact been reached, the buyer
must so certify as part of his implied obligation to co-operate in the
performance of the contract. Similarly if the buyer proposes a varia-
tion and the builder notifies the buyer of the impact in price, perfor-
mance and delivery, the buyer must co-operate to agree, propose an
alternative solution or abandon the proposed variation. If this is not
spelled out in the contract expressly, a duty to co-operate in the pro-
ject will be implied.”93 (emphasis added)
It seems to suggest that where a buyer proposes a variation to the specification
of the shipbuilding contract and the other side, the builder, responds with con-
cerns and problems, the buyer must cooperate to agree, propose other options
or abandon the suggested changes. Could this be interpreted as opening up a
passage for reading into the implied term of cooperation, a duty to vary (rene-
gotiate) the contract? It has to be said that the jury is definitely still out given the
following reasons:
(a) this decision is unlikely to be setting a rule that such an implied term is to
be found in shipbuilding contracts, much less, general commercial contracts;
(b) the nature of the shipbuilding contract is such that the buyer is entitled to
make suggestions for variation to the project but the expectation is that
these variations should be workable modifications. Hence, the modifica-
tions should operate within the boundaries of the original project. In cases
of economic hardship, the variation (renegotiation) of the original contract
may be quite far reaching as the parties attempt (in good faith) to overcome
the hardship and rebuild a new equilibrium;
(c) the nature of the shipbuilding contract is also such that it is a long term
relationship with built intervals or milestones for variation. That is not
always the case with general commercial cases encountering changed cir-
cumstances.
93 Ibid., at para 32.
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In the final analysis, although we have seen some inroads to a general principle
of good faith being attempted judicially, English jurisprudence is nevertheless
still largely resistant to good faith type solutions to cases of changed circumstan-
ces or economic hardship.
6. Contractual Devices and Legal Doctrine
23. It is clear that in English law, despite these various excursions into the terri-
tory of good faith, the preferred option is for the parties to provide for their own
protection and preservation. This can take the form of clauses providing for
hardship, renegotiation, cancellation, time extension or simply, good faith. It
should be said that is very much the case with civilian systems. Take the Italian
system for example, in the case cited above, Ravennavi S.P.A. v. Handitankers94,
it was quite clear that regardless of the London arbitration clause, the failure of
the parties to insert a hardship clause was not viewed positively by the Ravenna
court. As regards the French context, it has been said that general hardship
clauses95 will not only describe what constitutes hardship but will often spell out
what remedial procedure needs to be followed to ensure a satisfactory out-
come96. The role of the French judiciary is then to ensure that the new bargain
is properly enforced. In a case decided by the Cour d’appel de Paris97 it was
ruled that a clause which merely called for the parties to consult with each other
in certain circumstances without setting expressly the procedure to adopt was
enforceable. The court held that it was prepared to compel negotiations between
the parties under the supervision of an independent third party so as to give
effect to the clause. The role of independent third parties in ensuring the [re-
]negotiations could work is crucial and accepted as trite in the French legal sys-
tem.
The monitoring of such protective contractual devices in civilian systems is not
often considered to be an extra-judicial function. Indeed, the courts would be
more than prepared to intervene to re-establish the equilibrium caused by chan-
ged circumstances where the contract expressly contained some form of words
to that effect. The courts would also be able to fill in gaps (as in the Paris case
94 Supra, n. 54.
95 As against indexation clauses. See also the strict monetary nominalism rule for all money debts
(Art. 1895 French civil code).
96 See E. BARANAUSKAS, P. ZAPOLSKIS, “The Effect of Change in Circumstances on the Performance of
Contract”, Jurisprudence, 4 (118) 2009, 200 and A. KARAMPATZOS, “Supervening Hardship as Subdi-
vision of the General Frustration Rule: A Comparative Analysis with Reference to Anglo-American,
German, French and Greek Law”, ERPL, 2/2005, 144.
97 Cour d’appel de Paris 28 September 1976, JCP 1979.II.18810.
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 5 / 2
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
138
above) where it is needed to give effect to the protective contractual device as
agreed between the parties.
24. In English law, whilst there is a general reticence towards interfering with
the parties’ express and literal frame of agreement, where affordable, the courts
are more ready to give force to the parties’ presumed intention as regards the
consequences of changed circumstances or economic hardship. Many civil law-
yers would of course be familiar with the infamous Walford v. Miles98 decided
by the House of Lords in which it was held that an agreement to agree was too
vague to be enforced99. It is certainly open to the interpretation that that meant
that an agreement to negotiate (or indeed, renegotiate) in good faith would be
unenforceable. However since the Court of Appeal decided in Petromec Inc
Petro-Deep Societa Armamento Navi Appoggio SPA v. Petrobras Brasileiro
SA100 Walford v. Miles must be confined to its set of facts. In Petromec, there
were a number of complex contracts which concern the purchase, charter and
insurance of an oil production platform. The transactions anticipated the need
to upgrade the platform at some future stage. Following the discovery of a new
oil field (Rocandor), changes had to be made to the contract. The parties then
agreed in a written agreement to negotiate in good faith for those changes to be
made to the contract. The question was whether the agreement to negotiate was
enforceable.
The court found that unlike Walford v. Miles where there was no agreement in
the first place, here there was a pre-existing detailed contract. Thus, even if the
negotiation agreement is unenforceable, the contract remains as whole enforce-
able. The agreement to negotiate was not a bare promise. As LJ Longmore said:
“It is not irrelevant that it is an express obligation which is part of a
complex agreement drafted by City of London solicitors and issued
under the imprint of Linklater & Paines (as Linklaters were then
known). It would be a strong thing to declare unenforceable a clause
into which the parties have deliberately and expressly entered. I have
already observed that it is of comparatively narrow scope. To decide
that it has ‘no legal content’ to use Lord Ackner’s phrase would be for
98 1992, 2, A.C., 128.
99 In that case, it was held that a duty to negotiate in good faith is inherently inconsistent with the
position of a negotiating party. In addition the court considered that such an agreement was unwork-
able in practice; “how is to the court to police such an agreement?” Similarly clauses providing for an
obligation on a party to use or exercise “all reasonable endeavours” could very well fall within the
same proscription. (See R&D Construction Group Limited v. Hallam Land Management Limited,
2009, CSOH, 128).
100 2006, 1, Lloyd’s Rep, 121.
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the law deliberately to defeat the reasonable expectations of honest
men …”101
25. It should be pointed out though that despite the preparedness of the court
in this case to support the enforcement of an agreement to negotiate in good
faith, there are fundamental problems where one party alleges that there has
been a breach committed when the other party walks away having commenced
discussions. It is easy enough to say that there is a breach if that party simply
refuses to negotiate; however, it is much more problematic to find if a party was
had committed a breach of good faith having started negotiations but then
walked away. Bringing an end to negotiations in bad faith is elusive concept102.
Be that as it may, the path having been partially cleared for the recognition of
agreements to negotiate in good faith, we see in Emirates Trading Agency LLC
v. Prime Mineral Exports Private Ltd103 the court even allowing the enforce-
ment of an agreement to open ‘friendly discussions’ in a commercial relati-
onship. The clause was adopted very much as an alternative dispute resolution
clause and the court saw no objections to its certainty. Mr Justice Teare consi-
dered that:
“where commercial parties have entered into obligations they reason-
ably expect the courts to uphold those obligations. The decision in
Walford v. Miles arguably frustrates that expectation”104
Mr Justice Teare was of the opinion that ‘friendly’ imported an element of good
faith.
26. The English courts have also traditionally been averse to enforcing agree-
ments referring to dispute resolution devices which lack specificity as to the pro-
cess to be followed. In Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa
Engenharia SA105 for example the court refused to enforce a mediation
clause106. The Court of Appeal held that the clause could not be enforced,
101 At para 121 of the judgment.
102 It has been said however that the fact that it is difficult to police the agreement does not mean that the
agreement is unenforceable (see United Group Rail Services v. Rail Corporation New South Wales
(2009) 127 Con LR, 202).
103 2014, EWHC, 2104.
104 At para 40.
105 2012, EWCA Civ, 6.
106 The relevant clause read: “If any dispute or difference of whatsoever nature arises out of or in connec-
tion with this Policy including any question regarding its existence, validity or termination, hereafter
termed as Dispute, the parties undertake that, prior to a reference to arbitration, they will seek to have
the Dispute resolved amicably by mediation.”
L A R C I E R    I H T  1 5 / 2
Tijdschrift voor Internationale Handel en Transportrecht
140
despite expressly recognising that the parties had plainly intended for it have
legal effect. The court was especially concerned that no mediation provider was
identified in the agreement, and there was no procedure for the selection of the
mediator. As the mediator would be central to the performance of the mediation
duty, the omission of a proper procedure for his or her appointment was fatal
to the clause. It would seem to follow that where there was the proper prescrip-
tion of the mediation procedure, the agreement would be sufficiently clear to be
enforced.
In Emirates Trading Agency LLC v. Prime Mineral Exports Private Ltd107
J. Teare considered that ‘friendly discussions’ did not require the intervention of
a third party (such as a mediator), therefore it was immaterial whether or not
third party monitoring of the ‘discussions’ was required.
27. It should perhaps be noted that given the way the English justice system
works, practical issues need to be considered. For instance, if the agreement to
(re-)negotiate in good faith is to be interpreted in the way J. Teare had
approached the ‘friendly discussion’ clause, that would necessitate a review of
evidence by the courts of what the parties said or did in the (re-)negotiations.
Many shipping and commercial negotiations take place on a ‘without prejudice’
basis. The vital question is whether these exchanges can be used in evidence or
made known to a judge following a subsequent dispute108. The UK Supreme
Court has recently confirmed in Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SA v. TMT
Asia Ltd109, not without controversy, that as an exception to the general rule
evidence of without prejudice exchanges can be adduced to interpret and
explain any settlement agreement which arises. It might be thought that the loss
of protection of those exchanges or communications could potentially lead to
less than frank and open negotiations. It is largely accepted in Anglo-American
business thinking that frank and open discussions during and concessions made
in a ‘without prejudice’ context provide the best chances of reaching a commer-
cial settlement. This is perhaps equally apposite in hardship renegotiation cases.
It would be interesting to evaluate how civilian jurisdictions which have increas-
ingly come to encounter ‘without prejudice’ communications.
107 Supra, No. 103.
108 In Rush & Tompkins Ltd v. Greater London Council, 1989, A.C., 1280 it was held that in general
the rule makes inadmissible in any subsequent litigation connected with the same subject matter proof
of any admissions made with a genuine intention to reach a settlement and that admissions made to
reach a settlement with a different party within the same litigation are also inadmissible, whether or
not settlement is reached with that party.
109 2010, UKSC, 44.
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28. In some cases, there is an explicit reference in the contract to ‘good faith’ –
so even if there is no implied term of good faith or a general legal principle of
good faith, the parties are obliged by an express term to act in good faith. What
does ‘good faith’ mean in cases where the contract contains an English applicable
law clause? The question is particularly concerning because, as has been stressed,
English law does not recognise a general concept of good faith in contractual
relations. A recent case goes some way at helping to provide a [new] construc-
tion, if not conception, of ‘good faith’. In CPC Group Limited v. Qatari Diar
Real Estate Investment Company110, as is becoming more common in transna-
tional commercial contracts, there is an express clause providing for the parties
to act in good faith towards each other. CPC and Qatar Diar had entered into a
joint venture to develop some land in London. However, following the informal
intervention of the Prince of Wales111, Qatar Diar decided not to proceed with
the planning application. The question was whether Qatar Diar had failed in
their duty of good faith to CPC. In that case, J. Vos noted the lack of English
authority as to the meaning of the obligation to act “in the utmost good faith and
referred to J. French’s analysis in Bropho v. Human Rights & Equal Opportunity
Commission112 which drew from many legal articles and textbooks, including
the U.S. Second Restatement of Contracts, which states, “good faith performance
or enforcement of a contract emphasises faithfulness as to an agreed common
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party”. In the
circumstances, J. Vos considered that the duty of good faith necessitated:
(a) Adherence to the spirit of the contract;
(b) Observe reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing; what is reasona-
ble depends on the factual background and nature of each contractual rela-
tionship;
(c) Adherence to the agreed common purpose;
(d) Act in a manner consistent with the legitimate expectations of the parties.
Whether this takes us, in practical terms, very far in seeking to enforce and give
effect to a hardship and/or renegotiation clause is perhaps questionable. How-
ever, this is yet another piece of the jigsaw in the gradual accretion of principles/
norms to make up new legal doctrine, which is entirely characteristic of the
common law.
110 2010, EWHC, 1535 (Ch).
111 A widely reported incident in the UK (see an extract of Prince Charles’ impassioned letter at www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/culture/culturenews/7850091/Prince-of-Waless-emotional-Chelsea-Barracks-letter-
revealed.html).
112 2004, FCAFC, 16.
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29. The challenges in drafting an appropriately protective clause in the contract
in respect of changed circumstances or hardship are well recognised113. Poor
drafting make the task of the tribunal or court much more difficult and in some
cases, the parties would be better off had there been no express provision in the
contract! That is especially the case in some civil law countries (such as Ger-
many) where the law readily steps in to provide for hardship, its definition and
consequences.
7. Conclusion
30. The subject under study is vast. This article seeks to examine, in some mod-
est way, the different normative approaches to hardship in a selection of western
European legal systems. It is suggested that the different legal systems cultural
perspective on hardship has a direct impact on the legal and contractual solu-
tions available to the contracting parties. In certain (but not all) civil law sys-
tems, it is quite clear that there are more legal or statutory solutions with varying
degree of clarity. In the English common law system, there are few legal solu-
tions although it has pointed out that instead of “swimming against the tide”114
certain concessions, albeit in a limited way, have been and are increasingly being
made to the accommodation of a principle of good faith. These concessions
however have not been explicitly extended to hardship but could prove, as con-
sistent with the common law character, to be the aperture the law needs to
extend judicial intervention to hardship cases. Contractual solutions of course
remain the best, whether in civil or common law systems. However how these
contractual devices are dealt and enforced by law continues to be a challenge. In
this article has traced some recent developments, especially in the common law,
and shown that those developments continually reflect the tension between doc-
trine and pragmatic commercial fairness. The beauty of the common law lies in
its gradual logical and intellectual incrementalism – although it does not please
the impatient amongst us, its conservatism is not always without merit in trans-
national shipping and commerce where certainty is highly prized.
113 Indeed, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has created a standard form clause for all
commercial parties to use. The ICC Hardship Clause reads: “Where a party to a contract proves that:
(a) the continued performance of its contractual duties has become excessively onerous due to an event
beyond its reasonable control which it could not reasonably have been expected to have taken into
account at the time of the conclusion of the contract; and that (b) it could not reasonably have avoided
or overcome the event or its consequences, the parties are bound, within a reasonable time of the
invocation of this Clause, to negotiate alternative contractual terms which reasonably allow for the
consequences of the event.”
114 See Yam Seng at para 124, supra, n. 78(per J. LEGGATT).
